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Introduction
Countries of South Asia do not fare well in the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. In the data 
compiled for 2003, Sri Lanka comes at 66th position, India at 
83rd, Pakistan at 92nd and Bangladesh at the very bottom of 
the pile at 133rd position (Transparency International, 2004). 
Considering that a lot of public investment has gone into the 
water sector in these countries, especially in India, it is not 
surprising that water sector too is beset by corruption. One 
of the least confronted challenges facing the achievement 
of Millennium Development Goals in the water sector is 
corruption in public water supply institutions.
The rich countries are not free of corruption in the water 
sector. In 1995, Lyonnaise des Eaux was prosecuted for paying 
a bribe to the Mayor of Grenoble to get a water contract. In 
the same year, two Generale des Eaux executives admitted 
making payments to elected officials on the French island of 
La Reunion in return for a water deal. In 1996, Government 
of Singapore blacklisted five multinational companies, Sie-
mens, Pirelli, BICC, Marubeni and Tomen from bidding for 
any government projects for five years after their consultant 
was convicted of paying bribes for utilities contracts. In case 
of developing countries, corruption is not confined to high 
level dealings. Moreover, the consumers are also caught in 
the web of corruption directly.
Not long back corruption was viewed as ‘beneficial grease’ 
for wheels of development (Lui, 1985). The word ‘corruption’ 
was avoided by international agencies; ‘lack of transparency’ 
and was often ignored as minor annoyance. “Corruption… 
what Corruption?” was the apt title of an influential paper 
on bribery in India (Schneck, 1989).
In the 1990’s ‘grease or sand’ debate occupied the atten-
This paper presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and 
corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation 
as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation is likely to induce participation and reduce 
corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large data base, interaction between various actors is analysed. In developing 
countries corruption takes many forms depending on the actors and the nature of transaction. Types and magnitude of 
corrupt behaviour are analysed and shortcomings of the current strategies to combat corruption are discussed. We find 
that corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is significantly higher than in the agencies run by the 
state government. This applies to almost all types of corruption. The reasons for this situation are discussed. Measures to 
combat corruption in decentralised water supply agencies are suggested.
tion of development economists. A consensus emerged that 
Marcos type of centralised well-organised corrupt state, 
where corruption is a necessary evil, would do better than a 
confused state like Russia under Yeltsin, where corruption is 
sand in the wheels of development. Though corruption is very 
difficult to measure, the current consensus is that all types of 
corruption, soft touch or hard graft, is bad for development. 
It is not merely a moral issue but an economic issue and a 
major obstacle to development in third world countries. In-
ternational agencies have graduated from skirting the issue 
to describing corruption as ‘a cancer that eats into social and 
economic fabric of development’ (Bitarabeho, 2003). Strong 
words indeed! And the prescription? Liberalise, globalise, 
privatise and decentralise (World Bank, 1997).
This paper analyses the nexus between corruption and 
decentralisation; the latter being the current mantra of devel-
opment being promoted by the international agencies. While 
no final solutions are provided, some policy implications can 
be drawn from the analysis.
The case for decentralisation
The Decentralisation of provision of public services is 
considered essential for improvement in the efficiency of 
the public sector. The standard argument provided by the 
theory of fiscal federalism is that within a region, there is 
varied preference. In area A, people prefer libraries, but 
in area B, the people may prefer more sports facilities. 
The same mix of libraries and sports facilities will satisfy 
neither. Decentralised provision makes it possible to give 
the residents of A and B the mix they want and, thereby, to 
increase welfare. This being so, the local governments are 
better placed to recognise the asymmetries in tastes and to 
ASTHANA
182
provide appropriate responses. The second argument is based 
on supply efficiency. The local government being closer to 
the people is more likely to run public service projects in 
the interest of the stakeholders.
A consensus is slowly emerging to the effect that decen-
tralisation is desirable not only from the point of view of 
sustenance of democracy but also of efficiency and honesty. 
Responsibility for provision of public services should lie 
with the lowest level of government, unless due to strong 
reason of externality, chargeability and technicity, the higher 
level has to step in. This is invariably the essence of policy 
advice given to developing countries by the international 
organisations.
Looking from the side of the demand efficiency, in devel-
oping countries the hypothesis on which this classical model 
rests is fragile. In the developing countries, the fine difference 
in preferences (e.g., parks versus libraries) is not the issue. 
The main issue is the satisfaction of basic needs.
From the supply efficiency side, few scholars have chal-
lenged the validity of the decentralisation approach. Even 
those of who have raised doubts are of the view that while 
the provision of infrastructure could be centralised, mainte-
nance should be decentralised because the local governments 
have comparative advantages in terms of information and 
incentive (Prud’homme, 1995).
The bias towards decentralisation in the federalism lit-
erature could be due to the fact that hardly any empirical 
studies relating to the comparative efficiency are available. 
Analysis is based on individual case studies and subjective 
assessments subject to the halo effect. The halo effect comes 
when something, which is politically or socially desirable, is 
also assumed to be economically efficient by the evaluators 
in their subjective evaluations (Isham et al., 1995).
The setting
The area of study covers the rural areas of two large central 
Indian states, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, which cover 
the whole of central India. These states together cover an 
area of 440,000 square kilometres and a population of 76 
million. Per capita income (US$ 313; PPP$ 1626) is lower 
than the Indian average (US$ 460; PPP$ 2390). 86 per cent 
of the population is below the international poverty line of 
two dollars a day and 44 per cent below one dollar a day. As 
per 2001 census, the literacy (64%) is only slightly lower 
than that of India as a whole (65%). Health standards are 
as poor as in the rest of India. Infant mortality rate is 99 
per thousand, even higher than that of India as a whole (61 
per thousand). If we leave out some small outlier states and 
metropolitan cities with high levels of human development, 
the demographic and socio-economic profile of the area of 
study is same as the rest of the India, and similar to the whole 
of South Asia (CMIE, 2004).
In general, small villages and remote habitats are served 
by handpumps whereas larger villages, usually with a 
compact population of 2,000 are covered through piped 
water schemes. Towns of all sizes have piped water supply 
schemes. Governments in India, at national, state and local 
levels spend over half a billion US$ for provision of water 
supplies. The national government does not directly imple-
ment any scheme, as under the Constitution of India, water 
supply is a state subject. It is up to the state governments to 
implement the scheme or leave it for the local governments 
to do the same.
Unlike other developing countries, foreign aid component 
in this sector is just about five per cent. Hence, policy mak-
ing is autonomous.
All state governments in India have decided to transfer the 
maintenance and operation of drinking water schemes to the 
local bodies. This decision, however, has yet not been fully 
implemented in most states. In general, NGOs have been in 
favour of decentralisation. The activist groups, however, hold 
the state governments responsible if there is an epidemic in 
an area even where the provision of water supply is under the 
control of the local authority. While the federal government 
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Table 1. Rent seeking in water sector
Table cell heading Customers Water Supply Staff Contractors Politicians
Water Supply Staff Speed money for new
connections and
repairs to existing
connections.
Falsifying records for
lower bills and
concealment of illegal
connections.
Contractors Contract kickbacks
and concealment of
sub-standard work.
Collusion in contract
bids.
Politicians Money or promise of
support for
prevention of
disconnection
Tendering kickbacks
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has been urging the states to go ahead with decentralisation, 
the international aid agencies are even more insistent. The 
German aid agency KfW withdrew the second stage of their 
rural piped water supply project from the state of Madhya 
Pradesh because decentralisation was incomplete.
On the other hand, the State Human Rights Commission, 
which has jurisdiction over the geographical area under 
study, has recommended that the maintenance and opera-
tion of drinking water schemes should be with agencies of 
the state government. The commission is of the view that 
the availability of safe drinking water is not merely a basic 
need but is also a human right and that the state government 
is better placed to safeguard this human right as compared 
to a local authority (MPHRC, 1999). 
Prevalence of corruption
The term corruption in this paper refers to a range of mis-
conduct involving the use of public office for private gain. 
There are four principal actors – the consumers, water 
service providers, contractors and politicians. Interactions 
are given in Table 1.
Consumers do not have dealings with the contractors but 
they must contend with interaction with all other actors. 
Contractors could deal with each other to form a cartel, but 
this will be possible only with the collusion of water service 
professionals and the politicians. This study, as also others 
indicate that cartelisation is not the dominant form of corrup-
tion. Contractors prefer to beat the system through tendering 
irregularities and passing on sub-standard work. On the one 
hand, corruption increases the bid price due to kickbacks, on 
the other it could reduce the same as the contractors know 
that they can get away with sub-standard work. Thus, the 
works do not cost much more than the Schedule of Rates 
prescribed by the State Government.
If S is the schedule of rates including contractor’s profit, 
in a corruption-free competitive environment, the bids 
should be clustered around S. If the bids are too high, there 
will be re-tendering. If a contractor has to pay an amount 
B1 to secure contract through tendering process and grease 
his way through passing of bills etc., saves an amount A 
through sub-standard work of which he passes on B2 as 
bribe to get away with it, in a competitive environment, the 
bids will cluster around S+ B1-A+ B2. If A, i.e., quantum 
of sub-standard work is fairly large, corruption can flourish 
in a competitive environment.
A cartel can be broken up by an outside contractor as 
also by the Government by plugging the loopholes in the 
Schedule of Rates. However, if a contractor tries to mini-
mise B1, (s)he is unlikely to get a contract and if (s)hedoes 
manage to get it, he may face harassment and his bills may 
be unduly delayed.
Water supply personnel are at various levels and corruption 
does seem to exist within this cadre. Field personnel have 
to get their travelling and contingency bills cleared from 
the accountants. Often, superiors have demanded bribe for 
favourable postings. This type of corruption is on the low 
key because the politicians can overrule senior personnel 
and transfers and postings are now the preserve of the rul-
ing politicians.
Thus our main focus is on interaction of water supply 
personnel with the consumers and the behaviour of con-
tractors. The former reduces the revenue while the latter 
reduces the cost.
Data
Since corruption cannot be measured directly and is extremely 
difficult to measure even indirectly, usually, perception of 
corruption is taken as a proxy. It is often assumed that this 
leads to under-reporting because persons engaged in cor-
ruption, even the sufferers of a corrupt system decline to 
report. Some sociological studies on the other report that 
corruption is not as wide-spread as perceived because persons 
not directly involved assume everyone in the system to be 
corrupt and single out individuals as exceptions. This study 
is neither an exposé of corruption nor an attempt to measure 
corruption accurately, but a comparison of corruption between 
two systems, under-reporting and over-reporting is unlikely 
to influence the results significantly.
The data is obtained from a large survey which covers 
issues other than corruption and decentralisation also. A 
2-stage random sampling method was used for the survey. 
In the first stage 200 water supply schemes were selected. 
From each of these schemes, 30 households were selected. 
Details are given in table 1. Data collection was achieved 
through semi-structured interviews based on pre-tested flex-
ible questionnaire. All the contractors concerned with these 
schemes were interviewed. Interviews were also conducted 
with ‘key informants’ viz. NGO staff, union representatives 
and elected officials.
Does decentralisation matter?
First we compared the general characteristics of two types 
of agencies. In terms of size and age, no significant differ-
ences were found. In terms of indicators of efficiency, we 
looked at expense per litre of production and production in 
litres per day per unit of assets.
According to both these measures, centralised agencies 
were found to be significantly more efficient than the de-
Table 2. Size of Samples
Sample Total Decent-
ralised
Central-
ised
Water supply agencies 200 149 51
Number of households 6000 4470 1530
Number of repairs 1620 1221 399
New connections 593 439 154
Contractors 508 398 110
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are not statistically significant.
The next sub-sample is still smaller – households that needed 
new connections. Only a small number paid bribes. This is 
explained by the fact that the water supply agencies are under 
intense pressure to regularise illegal connections. Instead of 
the applicants requesting expeditious connection, often the 
consumers have to be persuaded to get legal connections 
when the water supply workers are under pressure to meet 
targets. Even so, the difference between decentralised agen-
cies and centralised agencies persists in a similar manner as 
in other forms of illegal payments.
Personnel policy
Unhealthy relationship between the staff members with the 
politicians and the local residents was cited as a major reason 
for higher levels of corruption in decentralised agencies. 
Local politicians are likely to be more subject to pressing 
demands from local interest groups. Managers under the 
state governments, move from place to place and have less 
unethical relationships with the local politicians (e.g., Kilt-
gaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
However, this is only one side of the coin. Following the 
British imperial tradition, most South Asian bureaucracies 
have impartial systems for recruitment and promotion, of-
ten an independent Public Service Commission overseeing 
these matters. As far as transfers are concerned, politicians 
elected for policy making and members of the legislature 
elected for law making have taken on the role of personnel 
managers. There is a thriving market for transfers. Often it 
is bartering of favours. A cash market for desirable posts 
also exists and movement from a ‘dry’ post to a ‘wet’ post 
can be expensive (Wade, 1985).
Neither the local governments nor the state governments 
have made any serious efforts for disciplining the corrupt 
personnel. Procedures are too cumbersome. A person who 
is punished has several opportunities of appeal and revision 
in his own hierarchy as also two or through levels of judicial 
redress. Removal from public service for corruption is rare. 
Those who were removed have come back with back wages 
and seniority restored through law courts. When it comes to 
‘carrot and stick’, it is absent both in case of decentralised 
and centralised agencies.
In India, while political decentralisation is substantial, ad-
ministrative decentralisation is incomplete. While officials of 
the local government are invariably elected, often the senior 
officials in local bodies are seconded to them from the state 
governments. It will be interesting to see what impact this 
oncoming change will have on corruption. In all likelihood, 
unless there are major institutional reforms, corruption is 
likely to increase because the local level bureaucrats have 
less independence from local politicians as compared to 
their state level counterparts.
Breaking the nexus
The main reason for higher level of corruption in decentral-
ized agencies seems to be that there are fewer obstacles to 
centralised ones.
Our primary aim is not to measure efficiency which could 
be higher in centralised agencies due to centralised inven-
tory control and more likely due to higher level of human 
resource development. Our aim is to empirically test the 
quantum of corruption.
For this purpose, first we focussed our attention on the 
consumers. Have they paid a bribe to an employee of the 
water utility during the last one year for any purpose relat-
ing to the water bill, be it for showing lower consumption, 
concealment of connection or whatever. As many as 51% 
respondents had paid bribe in case of decentralised agencies 
and 41% in case of centralised agencies. There is a caveat 
here. Many respondents said that it was not a bribe. They 
gave ‘tip’ so that the bills are not inflated. Since it was very 
difficult to segregate the two types of payment and often 
the purpose of the payment was to secure both objectives, 
a combined figure is reported in table 3. The median of this 
transaction is very small and there were no complaints of 
extortion. The difference between the amount paid in case 
of decentralised agencies and centralised agencies is not 
statistically significant.
Next sub-sample was smaller, as we considered only those 
consumers who needed repairs during the last one year. Of 
these, 39% respondents had paid bribe in case of decentralised 
agencies and 41% in case of centralised agencies. The caveat 
mentioned earlier applies. Again, while there is a significant 
difference in the proportion of transactions which involved 
speed money when we compare decentralised agencies and 
centralised agencies, the amounts involved in the transaction 
Table 3. Type of Corruption
Type of corruption Decent-
ralised
Central-
ised
Dif-
ference
Falsifying records for lower
bills
0.51 0.41 0.10***
Median Payment per
transaction
US$
0.45
US$
0.46
-0.01
Expediting repairs 0.39 0.30 0.09***
Median Payment per
transaction
US$
1.90
US$
1.92
-0.02
Expediting new
connections
0.15 0.10 0.05***
Median Payment per
transaction
US$
22.98
US$
23.50
-0.52
Kickbacks from contractors 0.75 0.73 0.02*
Notes:
*significance at the 10 percent level,
**significance at the 5 per cent level, and
***significance at the 1 percent level.
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corruption at the local level.
Monitoring and inspections are better developed at the 
state level. There is no quick-fix solution to this as capacity 
building and institutional development, even if seriously 
pursued, will take a long time.
There is a strong system of audit at the state level function-
ing under the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who 
under the Constitution is completely immune from political 
pressures. At the local level, auditing systems are neither as 
strong nor immune from political influence.
In a free democratic society, exposure to the media could 
be a strong check on corruption. Since the media at the local 
level is under developed, the pressure of the media, if it exists 
at all, is hardly a disincentive at the local level.
An argument often advanced in favour of decentralisation 
is the fact that participation by stake holders is likely to re-
duce corruption. There is some evidence that participation 
by the beneficiaries in drinking water projects leads to better 
project outcomes (Briscoe and de Ferranti, 1988; Isham et 
al., 1995). Decentralisation is not the same as participation. 
When social inequalities supplement economic inequali-
ties, the process of decentralisation is political rather than 
participative and liable to be captured by the local elite. The 
pressures of caste, tribe and local politics are too strong even 
for a well-meaning local government official. Location of 
public water stand posts is an example. The state govern-
ments have issued clear guidelines as to how these should 
be located with a view to serve the disadvantaged sections 
of society. Often, the local level functionaries are compelled 
to install these near the influential households.
Free market enthusiasts believe that privatisation of water 
supply will end corruption. Privatisation can improve the 
situation only partially. When the local government selects 
the private provider and supervises the service, the problem 
of corruption will remain.
The foregoing analysis does not necessarily mean that 
decentralisation is a wrong policy and with more and more 
decentralisation to come, there will be more and more 
corruption. Some signals to the contrary do appear on the 
horizon.
The silver lining is increased transparency through Infor-
mation Technology. Not only the state government agencies, 
but also the local governments are moving towards e-govern-
ance.  A computerised system of monitoring is coming into 
place. The customers and contractors can lodge applications, 
complaints, tenders and many other items on line. A lot of 
material is being published on the web sites in vernacular. 
This is like to reduce corruption in the time to come.
IT by itself may not achieve the end, though. The only 
valid argument in favour of decentralisation, rarely ad-
vanced, is that of learning by doing. Under the guidance of 
the state governments and under pressure from the people 
and the NGOs, the local governments have to learn to be 
less corrupt. This would take time even if a carefully formu-
lated strategy is put in place. At present, there is only ham 
handed pressure from the metropolitan elite and the donor 
community for decentralisation. Another strategy could be 
to sidetrack centralisation-decentralisation dichotomy, em-
power the people to band together, form NGOs and engage 
in provision of public services that the local governments 
fail to provide satisfactorily. In most developing countries 
no long term viable strategy is in place. With advances in 
IT, perhaps India can show the way.
Conclusion
There is enough evidence to believe that corruption in 
the provision of public services in developing countries 
is widespread. Since large amounts of public money are 
pouring into water supply systems in India, there is reason 
to believe that substantial amounts are being siphoned off. 
The legitimate question is whether decentralisation improves 
services through greater transparency or are we merely 
decentralising corruption.
Decentralisation of corruption can have beneficial redis-
tributive effects. But there is also evidence that corruption 
is more prevalent at local level as compared to regional and 
national level.
It is often assumed that the people want decentralisation 
while the regional level governments oppose it. This view 
is without foundation. There has never been any referendum 
to determine what the people want. The decisions relating 
to decentralisation are taken without consulting the people, 
paradoxically, at the central level.
Combating corruption, however, does not mean doing 
away with decentralisation. What is needed is not taking 
decentralisation as an end in itself. Decentralisation has to be 
accompanied by strong measures to promote transparency.
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